The Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision: Moving a Bishop Vertically in the Precarious ICSID Syste by Wilson, Michael
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
2-1-2012
The Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision:
Moving a Bishop Vertically in the Precarious
ICSID Syste
Michael Wilson
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Wilson, The Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision: Moving a Bishop Vertically in the Precarious ICSID Syste, 43 U. Miami Inter-
Am. L. Rev. 347 (2012)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol43/iss2/6
347
NOTE
The Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision:
Moving a Bishop Vertically in the
Precarious ICSID System
Michael Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 347
II. PERSPECTIVE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ICSID
TRIBUNAL DECISIONS ................................. 354
A. The NPM Clause and the Customary Necessity
Defense: A Concise Background ................ 354
B. The Nexus Between the NPM Clause and the
Customary Necessity Defense: A Center of
Contention ................................ 356
C. The ICSID Tribunals' Interpretations of the Only
Way Provision of the Customary Necessity
Defense .................................... 359
III. EVOLUTION: THE ICSID ANNULMENT COMMITTEE
DECISIONS: FALLOUT OR REFORM? . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  361
A. Red Flags Raised for Annulment Committees to
Consider ... ............................. 361
B. The CMS v. Argentina Annulment Decision...... 363
C. The Sempra v. Argentina Annulment Decision ... 364
D. The Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision .... 366
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ENRON v. ARGENTINA ANNULMENT
DECISION ............................................ 367
A. Parsing the Only Way Provision of the Customary
Necessity Defense ........................... 367
B. Left in Limbo: The NPM Clause and the
Customary Necessity Defense. ................. 370
C. Are Errors of Law Enough for Annulment? . . . . . . 372
V. FINALITY: THE WRITING IS ON THE WALL ............. 375
* Student Writing Editor, INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW; J.D. candidate,
University of Miami School of Law, 2012. This article is dedicated to my parents, Jan
and Alan. A special thanks to Jehovah Nissi.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:2
I. INTRODUCTION
Argentina's grandiose economic problems of the 21st century
date back to its government's decisions during the late 1980s
under the rule of former President Carlos Menem.' Menem's
regime attempted to reform the collapsed Argentine economy by
passing a "Convertibility Law," which set a fixed exchange rate of
one Argentine peso to one U.S. dollar and was largely successful in
keeping inflation static for over a decade.' Taking a step further
towards change, Menem privatized many State-owned entities
and loosened restrictions on trade in order to attract foreign
investment.3 Subsequently, Argentina signed many bilateral
investment treaties (BIT) with other countries,' which facilitated
foreign investment by providing investors with protections
against host-state derogation, guarantees for contractual rights,
and national protection.'
The effectiveness of Menem's reforms was ephemeral, how-
ever, since in the late 1990s and early 21st century Argentina's
economy did not fare as well, with unemployment rising to nearly
25%.1 When the International Monetary Fund stopped releasing
funds to Argentina in December of 2000, the country lapsed into
the largest sovereign default in its history.' Foreign investors and
Argentine citizens began rapidly pulling funds from their Argen-
tine bank accounts, but the government responded by capping
1. Daniel A. Krawiec, Sempra Energy International v. the Argentine Republic:
Reaffirming the Rights of Foreign Investors to the Protection of ICSID Arbitration, 15
L. & Bus. REV. Am. 311, 317 (Spring 2009).
2. Becky L. Jacobs, Pesification and Economic Crisis in Argentina: The Moral
Hazard Posed by a Politicized Supreme Court, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 391,
398-399 (Summer 2003).
3. See Krawiec, supra note 1, at 317.
4. For a list of Argentine BITs, see U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD],
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, at 26-27, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2
(Dec. 2000) (prepared by Abraham Negash), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf.
5. See William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability
Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN LAW,
Paper 202, 1 (2008), http://1sr.nellco.org/upenn-wps/202; For general knowledge of
protections provided under BITs, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 233-58 (2004); Andrew Guzman, Review Essay, 6 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 612, 613-14 (1995).
6. Argentina's Collapse: A Decline Without Parallel, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 28,
2002, at 26, http://www.economist.com/node/1010911. See also Jacobs, supra note 2,
at 399.
7. Jacobs, supra note 2, at 400.
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withdrawal amounts.' In the midst of the crisis and under the
direction of new interim President Eduardo Duhalde, the Convert-
ibility Law was abolished, allowing the peso to float freely on the
international currency exchange.9 Duhalde also enacted the con-
troversial "Emergency Law," which mandated the conversion of
bank deposits denominated in U.S. dollars to Argentine pesos,
otherwise known as "pesification."'o After pesification, most for-
eign investors instantly lost two-thirds of their income," making it
clear that their assets were invariably linked to Argentina's politi-
cal discretion notwithstanding any contemporaneous BITs.
In the 1990s, the former Enron Corporation invested in the
newly privatized energy sector of Argentina. When the Argentine
government made changes to its currency laws in the early 21st
century, the value of Enron's investments was rapidly diminished.
Enron, among other international corporations, filed a claim
against Argentina before the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID),1 2 arguing that Argentina
breached the U.S.-Argentina BIT13 by altering Argentina's laws
during the economic crisis.1 4 The ICSID is a forum under the gui-
dance of the World Bank that allows for direct investor-state arbi-
tration of which the majority of claims filed allege violations of
BITs.15 The ICSID system is one without an appellate procedure
or a corresponding concept of stare decisis;16 as such, losing parties
8. The limitation on withdrawals was colloquially known as a "corralito." Id. at
401.
9. See id. at 402-03; see also Krawiec, supra note 1, at 318.
10. Krawiec, supra note 1, at 318.
11. See id.
12. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
13. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-2 (1993) [hereinafter
U.S.-Arg. BIT].
14. Argentina has the largest number of investor state arbitrations of any of the
81 countries in the ICSID system, having entered into roughly 51 at the end of 2009.
See International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Pending and
Concluded Cases [hereinafter ICSID Cases], http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front
Servlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases; see also Latest Developments
in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Issues Note No. 1, 13 (2010), http://www.
unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20103_en.pdf.
15. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 1.
16. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Continuing Appeal of Annulment: Lessons from
Amco Asia and CME, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING
CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 471 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005) (explaining, "Parties to an ICSID
2012] 349
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are stuck with the finality of Tribunal decisions." However, any
losing party may petition to have an ICSID Tribunal's award
vacated through the annulment process." If annulment is suc-
cessful a losing party will not be liable to pay damages assigned by
the Tribunal. Awards against Argentina tend to be set in the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars and are "among the highest ever ren-
dered by an ICSID tribunal."'
In the litigation that ensued after the enactment of the Emer-
gency Law, Argentina has persistently argued that the currency
changes adopted during its national crisis effectively invoke the
BIT's non-precluded measures (NPM) clause,20 which would
release it from liability to its investors. The treaty's NPM clause is
a standard provision in BITs that exempts State action during
extraordinary circumstances from the protections of the BIT.2 1
Whether Argentina can properly invoke the NPM clause turns on
whether its decision to allow the peso to float and to pesify bank
accounts was "necessary for the maintenance of public order."2
The ICSID has found it an arduous task to define the extent that
the NPM clause applies to Argentina's actions during the crisis.
arbitration are able to seek annulment of an award rendered under the ICSID
Convention, but are not able to appeal the merits of the award.").
17. See David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process,
7 ICSID REV. 21, 25 (1992) (noting, "in a sense, annulment is all that doctrinally
survives the parties agreement to regard the award as final and binding.").
18. Article 52 of the ICSID Convention reads, "Either party may request
annulment of the award." ICSID Convention, supra note 13; cf., Bjorklund, supra note
16, at 471.
19. Josd E. Alvarez and Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign
Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in THE YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLIcY 379, 380 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008/
2009).
20. Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT does not preclude the government from
adopting "measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of
its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests." U.S.-Arg. BIT,
supra note 13. This clause has also been referred to by many scholars as the
-measures not precluded" clause. See, e.g., Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 19, at 380.
On NPM clauses in BITs generally, see William W. Burke-White & Andreas von
Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and
Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties,
48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307 (2008).
21. See Steven Smith & Kevin Rubino, Investors Beware: Enron and Sempra
Annulment Decisions Bolster the State of Necessity Defense While Sowing New
Uncertainty regarding the Finality of ICSID Arbitral Awards, O'Melveny & Myers
LLP News Alert (Aug. 9, 2010), available at http://www.omm.com/investors-beware-
enron-sempra-annulment-decisions-bolster-state-necessity-defense-while-sowing-
new-uncertainty-regarding-finality-of-icsid-arbitral-awards-08-09-2010/.
22. U.S.-Arg. BIT, supra note 13, art. XI.
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This problem arises from the BIT itself, which does not define
necessity or the conditions for its application. Some Tribunals
have thus responded by using the customary necessity defense,2 3
which is conceded by both parties to be reflected by Article 25 of
the International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on State
Responsibility, 24 to interpret the NPM clause; of course, such an
analysis begs the question as to the proper relationship between
the NPM clause and the customary necessity defense.
Argentina has importunately advanced a second argument-
the customary necessity defense-asserting that it precludes any
illegitimacy of Argentina's actions in response to the emergency. 25
Alternative to the NPM argument,2 6 the customary necessity
defense argument turns on whether Argentina's actions were the
"only way for the State to safeguard . .. against a grave and immi-
nent peril," also known as the only way provision.2 7 The ICSID
Tribunals have not only applied the customary necessity defense
disparately, but also have interpreted the only way provision dif-
ferently. 28 The heart of the application debate is whether the cus-
tomary necessity defense can be applied directly to the NPM
clause or, to the contrary, as a secondary measure only after the
NPM clause has been parsed independently. The core of the inter-
pretive quandary is whether the only way provision should be
interpreted literally-in which case there will almost always be
23. Many scholars refer to the customary necessity defense as the "customary law
defense of necessity" or "customary international law as reflected in Article 25 of the
ILC's Articles," among other names. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 5, at 18; Smith
& Rubino, supra note 21, para. 5. For sake of simplicity, however, this note refers to it
only as the customary necessity defense.
24. See Smith & Rubino, supra note 21, para. 5; Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries,
art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC's Articles].
25. See Smith & Robino, supra note 21, para. 4 (describing Argentina's perspective
on its actions as "necessitated by a collapsing economy that had produced nationwide
rioting and five different presidents in the span of a month. [Argentina] argue[s] that
its actions were accordingly exempted from liability by both Article XI of the BIT as
well as customary international law.").
26. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining that Argentina has set forth
two distinct arguments: one based on treaty law and the other based on customary
international law).
27. ILC's Articles, supra note 24, art. 25(1)(a).
28. See Andreas von Staden, Reestablishing Doctrinal Clarity and Correctness:
Treaty Exceptions, Necessity, and the CMS, Sempra, and Enron Annulment Decisions,
October 9, 2010, CZECH YEARBOOK INT'L L., vol. 2 (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3,
on file with SRRN), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689872 (explaining frankly
that "the interpretation of the elements of the necessity defense . . has often been
lacking systematic approach and proceeded in so cursorily a manner that if a law
student had done so in a final exam, he or she might well have failed.").
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another hypothetical way for the government to have acted-or
conversely, interpreted to mean the only logical way after balanc-
ing a variety of factors.
Enron v. Argentina is one of five recent cases brought under
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the other are: CMS v. Argentina, Sempra
v. Argentina, LG&E v. Argentina, and Continental Casualty v.
Argentina;2 9 collectively, these cases are known as the "Argentine
Gas Sector Cases."" Among these cases, only CMS, Sempra, and
Enron have issued annulment decisions 31 with the others pending
annulment review.32 The issues arising in Enron are no different
than those in the other Argentine Gas Sector Cases since parties
to the arbitration proceedings have essentially made the same
arguments of law; notwithstanding, equivocation has permeated
the ICSID Tribunal decisions. The judges for these disputes have
given ambiguous and in some cases contradictory analyses reach-
ing antithetical holdings for cases with identical facts. Evidently
noting this flagrancy in Tribunal decisions, the Enron, Sempra,
and CMS Annulment Committees have provided Tribunals with
doctrinal correctness while attempting to solidify the integrity of
the ICSID system.3 4 In doing so, however, the Annulment Com-
29. See ICSID Cases, supra note 14.
30. See Alvarez and Khamsi, supra note 19, at 379.
31. Enron Corp. Ponderosa Asset, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Annulment Decisions of July 30, 2010 [hereinafter Enron Annulment];
Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Annulment Decision of June 29, 2010 [hereinafter Sempra Annulment]; CMS Gas
Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Annulment Decision of Sept. 25, 2007 [hereinafter CMS Annulment].
32. LG&E Annulment and Continental Casualty Annulment were registered on
September 19, 2008, and January 14, 2009, respectively. See http://icsid.worldbank.
org/.
33. See Matthew Parish, On Necessity, 11 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 169, 193
(2010), available at http://www.matthewparish.com/pdf/On-Necessity.pdf (arguing,
"the risk of inconsistent decisions is, as was seen in the Argentina arbitrations, more
than merely fanciful. The varying tribunals came to opposite conclusions on (exactly)
the same facts, without commenting significantly one upon the other or giving any
explanation in law or fact of their differing reasoning;" see also Sahib Singh, Necessity
in Investor-State Arbitration: The Sempra Annulment decision, August 16, 2010,
EJIL: Talk! (Blog of the European Journal of International Law), at 1, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1660584 (noting that "discrepancies in reasoning still
appear.").
34. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 29 (noting, "[t]he [CMS] Annulment
Committee may have found the award and the fact that its analysis was quickly
becoming the majority approach in the Argentine cases so legally troubling that it
sought to vitiate the award of any precedential value and ensure that subsequent
tribunals addressing similar issues did not follow the CMS Tribunal's line of
analysis.").
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mittees may have crossed their delegated authority in order to
correct the Tribunals' egregious errors of law.
The Enron Annulment Committee found grounds for annul-
ment on three bases: first, it held that the Enron Tribunal did not
apply the customary necessity defense, resulting in a "manifest
excess of powers," which is a violation of Article 52(1)(b) of the
ICSID Convention.15 Second, the Committee noted that the Tribu-
nal's failure to apply the customary necessity defense affected its
analysis of the NPM clause, which also resulted in a manifest
excess of powers.3 6 Third, the Committee decided that if the Tribu-
nal had applied the customary necessity defense sub silentio, then
it still "failed to state the reasons for [its] decision,"3 which is a
violation of Article 52(1)(e) of the ICSID Convention.3 8 There are
five grounds for annulment under the ICSID Convention,3 9 but
only two of relevance for the Argentine Gas Sector Cases-Article
52(1)(b) and Article 52(1)(e).
This note argues that the Enron Annulment decision moves
the ICSID a step closer towards legitimacy in investment arbitra-
tion, adds a talismanic piece to the ICSID puzzle, and leaves the
proper scope of annulment review ambiguous but evidently expan-
sive. Enron Annulment's approach to the customary necessity
defense should be applauded since it gives an adequate paradigm
for Tribunals to parse the only way provision, which was promi-
nently absent from former rulings,4 0 and provides State parties to
the BIT with a fairer standard that doesn't preclude the necessity
defense." Part II of this note examines the relevant ICSID Tribu-
nal decisions leading up to Enron Annulment while focusing on
the interpretation of contentious provisions of the NPM clause
35. Enron Annulment, supra note 31, para. 377; ICSID Convention, supra note 12,
art. 52.
36. Enron Annulment, supra note 31, para. 405; cf., ICSID Convention, supra note
12, art. 52(1)(b).
37. Enron Annulment, supra note 31, para. 384.
38. ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 52.
39. Id.
40. All other ICSID Tribunals and Annulment Committees have interpreted this
clause so narrowly that they have effectively passed over it. See generally August
Reinisch, Necessity in International Investment Arbitration - An Unnecessary Split of
Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS and LG&E, 8 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT & TRADE 191 (2007) (noting, "other ways had been available
therefore, the invocation of the necessity plea failed.").
41. Many commentators have responded to Tribunals' analyses as an obviation of
the necessity clause. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 2 (asserting, "ICSID Tribunals
... have interpreted the customary law doctrine of necessity extremely narrowly-so
narrowly as to make it essentially unavailable to any state.").
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and its nexus to the customary necessity defense. Part III consid-
ers the ICSID Annulment decisions that have preceded and influ-
enced the Committee in Enron Annulment. Part IV highlights
Enron Annulment's reasons for annulment, analyzing whether its
novel treatment of the only way provision was necessary and
whether mere errors of law are enough to trigger annulment. Part
IV also questions Enron Annulment's errant disregard of the rela-
tionship between the NPM clause and the customary necessity
defense. Part V concludes by discussing the proper balance
between the concepts of finality and substantive correctness in the
ICSID system, focusing on their relevance and direction post-
Enron Annulment.
II. PERSPECTIVE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ICSID
TRIBUNAL DECISIONS
A. The NPM Clause and The Customary Necessity
Defense: A Concise History
The purpose of the ICSID and BITs are to provide investors
with protection against State injury to international invest-
ments.4 2 More than twenty-five of the cases pending before the
ICSID have been brought against Argentina alleging that Argen-
tina's response to the economic crisis of 2001-2002 abrogated
investor rights safeguarded under Argentine BITs.4 3 Argentina's
arbitration cases invariably involve an analysis of the BIT's NPM
clause and the ILC's customary necessity defense, which measure
the extremes of Argentina's freedom to act in anomalous circum-
stances and the extent investor's rights curtail such freedom.4 4
Traditional legal doctrine affirms the customary necessity
defense as a valid basis for precluding wrongfulness under cus-
tomary international law." The threshold, however, for invoking
42. See Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for
Accuracy Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 444, 444-45
(2006) (explaining that the intent of the ICSID Convention is "to enforce a regime of
investors' rights.").
43. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 1; see also Alan Cibilis, ICSID bleeds
Argentina, in MULTINATIONAL MONITOR JOURNAL, July 1, 2005, at 4, available at http:/
/www.allbusiness.com/specialty-businesses/846549-1.html. Cibilis's satirical title,
that ICSID is literally bleeding Argentina, comes not only from the many claims filed
against Argentina, but also from the estimation of the lucrative prospects for
investors since the "total potential claims ... are estimated at more than $30 billion."
44. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 2.
45. See Reinisch, supra note 40, at 195; c.f Julio Barboza, Necessity (Revisited) in
International Law, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS27, 41 (1984)
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and utilizing the customary necessity defense is rather high;4 6 the
ILC, which drafts the modern standards for customary interna-
tional law, describes the customary necessity defense as "nar-
row[ ]" and "only rarely .. . available to excuse non-performance of
an obligation."47 While many precedents have acknowledged the
customary necessity defense as a matter of law, this seemingly
legitimate defense has almost always been rebuffed-it has his-
torically only been a nominative defense.4 8 Although the ILC's
Articles should be interpreted narrowly in order to prevent
exploitation by State actors and to ensure justification for inten-
tional and illegitimate acts,4 9 the consequence of a narrow
approach is that the customary necessity defense is preemptively
and surreptitiously vitiated from customary international law.o
In the past decade, however, there has been a lack of consen-
sus among the ICSID Tribunals regarding the correct interpreta-
tion of the customary necessity defense, and moreover, of the
NPM clause;" indeed, numerous commentators have considered
the Tribunals' analyses particularly frustrating.5 2 However, the
legal principles to be applied have developed a closer harmony
albeit with subsequent disaccord in application." For instance
Article 25 of the ILC's Articles is generally accepted as the correct
(explaining that "necessity is an admitted cause in international law for preclusion of
responsibility for State conduct not in conformity with an international obligation.").
46. See Reinisch, supra note 40, at 195-96 (explaining that while "necessity has
been recognized as a customary international law rule ... [the] restricted availability
of the necessity defense is . . confirmed by a number of older precedents.").
47. Int'l Law Comm'n, Commentary to Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, art. 25, paras. 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/
56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Commentary to the ILC's Articles].
48. See Reinisch, supra note 40, at 196.
49. See Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, New Approaches to the State of Necessity in
Customary International Law: Insights from WTO Law and Foreign Investment Law,
19 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 463, 463 (2008) (noting, "the ILC's Articles . need to be
interpreted narrowly in order to prevent the abuse of [the customary necessity
defense] . . .").
50. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing, "ICSID Tribunals . have
interpreted the customary law doctrine of necessity extremely narrowly-so narrowly
as to make it essentially unavailable to any state.").
51. See Reinisch, supra note 40, at 212 (noting the "divergent results" in recent
Tribunal decisions).
52. See von Staden, supra note 28, at 210 (noting the egregious equivocation
among various Tribunals, "it is precisely with respect to doctrinal clarity and
correctness that several of the awards rendered against Argentina have fallen
surprisingly short.").
53. See Parish, supra note 33, at 184 (affirming that "something of a consensus
has emerged about the legal principles applicable where a state raises a necessity
defense.").
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promulgation of the customary necessity defense;5 4 nevertheless,
the ensuing jurisprudence of the Argentine Gas Sector Tribunal
Cases is convoluted and problematic due to shoddy legal reason-
ing, suspicious treaty interpretation, and inconsistent holdings in
the Tribunal awards."
The Enron, Sempra, and CMS Tribunal decisions all found
the NPM clause and the necessity defense inapplicable." Accord-
ing to the Tribunals, Argentina's arguments did not overcome the
threshold for invoking the customary necessity defense, and there-
fore an analysis of the NPM clause was unnecessary. In contrast,
the LG&E and Continental Casualty Tribunals found the NPM
clause properly invoked and the customary necessity defense
applicable to Argentina." Save LG&E and Continental Casualty,
former Tribunals have essentially curbed the NPM clause through
a narrow and vapid reading of the customary necessity defense.
The divergence in the Argentine Gas Sector Tribunal Cases cen-
ters on the Tribunals' disparate understanding of the connection
between the NPM clause and the customary necessity defense.
B. The Nexus Between The NPM Clause and The
Customary Necessity Defense: A Center of
Contention
The Tribunals for the Argentine Gas Sector Cases had an
opportunity to obviate the ambiguity surrounding the correct
interpretation and application of the NPM clause in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. Aside from Continental Casualty, the other Tribu-
nals accepted the ILC's Articles as the appropriate medium to
interpret the NPM clause," but applied them variably to deter-
54. See Reinisch, supra note 40, at 196.
55. See von Staden, supra note 28, at 211 (explaining, "several of the [Tribunal]
awards . . . have come under close scrutiny.").
56. Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award of May 22, 2007, para. 339 [hereinafter Enron award];
Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award of Sept. 28, 2007, para. 391 [hereinafter Sempra award); CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of
May 12, 2005, para. 373 [hereinafter CMS award].
57. See Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. v. The
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decisions on Liability of Oct. 3, 2006,
para. 266 [hereinafter LG&E Liability decision]; Continental Casualty v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case no. ARB/03/9, Award of Sept. 5, 2008, para. 192 [hereinafter
Continental Casualty award].
58. Continental Casualty award, supra note 57, para. 192; CMS award, supra note
56, para. 315; LG&E Liability decision, supra note 57, para. 245; Enron award, supra
note 56; Sempra award, supra note 56.
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mine the relevance of the NPM clause.59 Notably, Continental Cas-
ualty and LG&E took the primary/secondary approach," whereas
Enron, Sempra, and CMS took the conflation approach." The pri-
mary/secondary approach analyzes the NPM clause first as the
primary rule, and only if a violation of that clause is found, then
an analysis of the customary necessity defense is triggered as a
secondary rule.6 2 The conflation approach is less sophisticated and
merely assumes that the customary necessity defense mirrors the
NPM clause; that is, the requirements of the customary necessity
defense are imported into the NPM clause.63
While struggling with these dual approaches, the Enron Tri-
bunal noted, "[B]ecause there is no specific guidance [regarding
how to interpret the NPM clause] . . . [t]his is what makes neces-
sary to rely on the requirements of state of necessity under cus-
tomary international law .. ." In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal
juxtaposed the NPM clause with the customary necessity defense,
finding that the requirements of the latter should not be inte-
grated into the former, explaining:
"The concept of excusing a State for the responsibility for
violation of its international obligations during what is
called a 'state of necessity' or 'state of emergency' also
exists in international law. While the Tribunal considers
that the protections afforded by Article XI (the NPM
clause) have been triggered in this case, and are sufficient
to excuse Argentina's liability, the Tribunal recognizes that
59. See Jos6 E. Alvarez and Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense:
Continental Casualty v. Argentina, INST. INT'L L. & JusT. Working Paper 2010/3,
Finalized 04/14/10, at 4, available at www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2010-3.
Alvarez-Brink.pdf (explaining, "the tribunals expressed divergent views on the
relationship between Art. XI and the CIL defense of necessity as codified in Art. 25 of
the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.").
60. While the prominence of the primary/secondary approach is much more
obvious in Continental Casualty, the LG&E Tribunal indubitably found that the
conflated approach was inappropriate; c.f, Burke-White, supra note 5, at 14 (noting,
"For the LG&E Tribunal, the NPM clause is a separate risk allocation device .
providing state parties greater protections than would have been available in
customary law.").
61. See Singh, supra note 33, at 3 (noting, "[The] Enron, CMS and Sempra
[Tribunals] have conflated the relationship between necessity under customary
international law and Article XI," and the Sempra Tribunal went so far as to
"prioritize the customary right over Article Xl." On the distinctions between the
primary/secondary and conflated approaches generally, see Jirgen T. Kurtz,
Adjudging The Exceptional At International Investment Law: Security, Public Order
And Financial Crisis, 325 INT'L& COMP. L.Q. 371, vol. 59, no. 2 (2010).
62. See Singh, supra note 33, at 3.
63. See von Staden, supra note 28, at 210-212.
64. Enron award, supra note 56, para. 333.
3572012]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:2
satisfaction of the state of necessity standard (the custom-
ary necessity defense) as it exists in international law ...
supports the Tribunal's conclusion.""
In reaching the conclusion that Argentina satisfied the require-
ments of the NPM clause, the LG&E Tribunal determined that it
was not required to further consider the elements of the custom-
ary necessity defense; rather, the latter was merely support for its
initial conclusion.6 6
Incidentally, the Tribunals for the Argentine Gas Sector
Cases were also inconsistent in their assessment of damages
should the NPM clause be found germane. The Tribunals taking
the primary/secondary approach decided that Argentina's finan-
cial liability would be excused for any breach of the BIT, at least
during the time of the crisis. In contrast, the Tribunals taking
the conflation approach determined that even if Argentina had a
legitimate defense under the NPM clause, it still would have a
duty to investors as a matter of principle, and evidently, as a mat-
ter of customary international law." In the latter case, a demon-
stration of necessity would preclude Argentina's wrongfulness but
not its liability to compensate investors, which is really just a way
of paying mere lip service to the necessity defense.
Yet it's not only the Tribunals who are splitting between the
primary/secondary and conflation approaches-scholars disagree
as to which paradigm is more suitable for the ICSID system. The
fortuitous argument for the primary/secondary approach is one of
legality; a reading of the customary necessity defense into the
NPM clause arguably violates the ILC's rule of lex specialis,"
65. LG&E Liability decision, supra note 57, para. 245 (parentheticals added).
66. See Alvarez & Brink, supra note 59, at 4 (noting, "LG&E appeared to treat
Article XI [i.e. the NPM clause] as a distinct defense ").
67. Continental Casualty award, supra note 57, para. 304, 320(A)-(B); LG&E
Liability decision, supra note 57, para. 124.
68. CMS award, supra note 56, para. 388; Enron award, supra note 56, para. 260;
Sempra award, supra note 56, para. 303.
69. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission: Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, para. 487, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
L.682 (Apr.13, 2006) [hereinafter ILC Fragmentation Report] (Martii Koskenniemi);
see also John Tobin, Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights
Treaty Interpretation, 23 HARv. Hum. RTs. J. 13, n.60., available at harvardhrj.com/
wp-content/uploads/2010/10/1-50.pdf (explaining, "This view reflects by implication
the limitations associated with article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT, which allows for recourse
to any subsequent practice in the application of a treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. This rule may be relevant to the
interpretation of bilateral treaties . .").
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which states simply that a particular provision may not preempt
recourse to other applicable provisions." In any event, supersed-
ing the NPM clause with the customary necessity defense appears
to be a violation of lex specialis. As a matter of policy, the incorpo-
ration of the customary necessity defense into the NPM clause
fails to recognize the actual understanding of the U.S.-Argentina
BIT as a quid pro quo for greater protections to investors than are
available under the customary necessity defense on the one hand
and greater freedom for a State to act on the other.7
Proponents of the conflation approach argue that the NPM
clause can only be logically interpreted within the framework of
the preexisting customary necessity defense as either broadening
or narrowing it.72 Under this view, a Tribunal reaching a conclu-
sion based on the NPM clause, without using the customary
necessity defense as an interpretive guide, would be acting sua
sponte." However, even some critics of the primary/secondary
approach would seem to prefer it to conflation because of its prag-
matism. Matthew Parish, who is adverse to the primary/secon-
dary approach, highlights that "[t]he ILC draft Articles [reflecting
the customary necessity defense] were grounded in neither prior
case law nor analysis of policy, and have proved themselves
impractical to apply."
C. The ICSID Tribunals' Interpretations of the Only
Way Provision
The only way provision is a concise but prominent piece of the
customary necessity defense found under Article 25(1)(a) which
reads, "Necessity may not be invoked by a State ... unless the act
... [uis the only way for the State to safeguard ... against a grave
and imminent peril . . . ."" As part of the analysis for the custom-
ary necessity defense, Tribunals have reached bifurcated holdings
as to the proper interpretation of the only way provision. At the
center of this disparity is whether "only way" should be inter-
preted literally-that is, if there were any conceivable option to
act available to the State, then the necessity defense is moot-or
70. See Alvarez & Brink, supra note 59, at 19.
71. If Judge Posner were sitting on an ICSID Tribunal, the conflation approach
would be considered profanity given its disregard for a requisite economic/risk
analysis. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 14.
72. See Parish, supra note 33, at 186-87.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 188.
75. ILC's Articles, supra note 24, art. 25.
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interpreted broadly, which considers a myriad of factors such as
whether a graver harm was evaded, whether the measures
adopted were adequate and/or their proportionality to the crisis. 6
In practice, the interpretation that a Tribunal selects usually
depends upon the amount of deference it gives to the State in
making policy decisions during times of peril.77 The more defer-
ence a Tribunal gives to a State, the more likely it is to interpret
the only way provision broadly.
The LG&E Tribunal deferred its judgment for that of Argen-
tina, concluding that it was not the Tribunal's role to second-guess
the policy decisions Argentina made during its emergency,
asserting:
"In this circumstance, an economic recovery package was
the only means to respond to the crisis. Although there may
have been a number of ways to draft the economic recovery
plan, the evidence before the Tribunal demonstrates that
an across-the-board response was necessary, and the tariffs
on public utilities had to be addressed."
Following a more sagacious standard, the LG&E Tribunal did not
query whether another course of action could have been taken or
whether a variable economic plan was available.7 ' This departure
from the literal reading of the only way provision started the cur-
rent trend towards a more sensible approach to the customary
necessity defense, whether or not formalistically proper."
Two years later, the Continental Casualty Tribunal continued
in the footsteps of LG&E by deferring considerably to Argentina's
policies in reaction to the financial crisis, arguing "[sitates are
basically free to adopt economic and monetary policies of their
choice."" Given the nearly insurmountable standard of necessity
as interpreted by the ILC,8 2 it is likely that the Continental Casu-
alty Tribunal attempted to find another means to give purpose to
the only way provision while not precluding the necessity
defense." By delegating these considerations to Argentina, who
76. See Reinisch, supra note 40, at 201 (criticizing the LG&E Tribunal for not
having "incorporated considerations of adequacy and proportionality.").
77. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 19-20.
78. LG&E Liability decision, supra note 57, para. 257.
79. See id.
80. See Parish, supra note 33, at 187 (noting, "Within [the LG&E Tribunal's]
analysis one may see the emergence of a rather different doctrine of necessity in
which the predominant test is proportionality . . ").
81. Continental Casualty award, supra note 57, para. 224.
82. See Commentary to the ILC's Articles, supra note 47, art. 25, paras. 1-2.
83. See Parish, supra note 33, at 188 (noting, ". . . because the tests [which the ILC
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was in a more appropriate position in the midst of the crisis to
make such a decision, the Continental Casualty Tribunal found
the elements of the customary necessity defense satisfied.
In an antithetical line of cases addressing the only way provi-
sion, the Tribunals for Enron, Sempra, and CMS questioned
Argentina's policy decisions, emphasizing that because some other
means were available to respond to the emergency, the customary
necessity defense was unavailable as a matter of law. The Enron
Tribunal opined, "A rather sad world comparative experience in
the handling of economic crises, shows that there are always
many approaches to address and correct such critical events, and
it is difficult to justify that none of them were available in the
Argentine case."" Similarly, the CMS Tribunal frankly claimed,
"[Tihe measures adopted were not the only steps available.""
Although the Enron, Sempra, and CMS Tribunals were deficient
in mentioning other alternative courses of action that Argentina
could have followed, the reality of the situation is that there will
always be another hypothetical course for a State to have taken;"6
however this fact does not necessitate a conclusion that the cus-
tomary necessity defense fails but for the only way provision. Such
realizations merely beg the question as to the proper analysis of
the only way provision, and in particular, whether the literal
approach to the only way provision is apposite.
III. EVOLUTION: THE ICSID ANNULMENT COMMITTEE
DECISIONS: FALLOUT OR REFORM?
A. Red Flags Raised for Annulment Committees to
Consider
The effects of the general ambiguity and potential diminution
of the customary necessity defense have been felt by States and
investors alike, many of whom are questioning the legitimacy of
the ICSID system." In fact, some States have abandoned the
draft Articles] prescribe are impossible to apply. . . the tribunal thus liberated itself
from the ILC's straightjacket, and struck out on its own, common sense[] course.").
84. Enron award, supra note 56, para. 308; see also Sempra award, supra note 56,
para. 350 (giving almost a verbatim analysis, "A rather sad global comparison of
experiences in the handling of economic crises shows that there are always many
approaches to addressing and resolving such critical events. It is therefore difficult to
justify the position that only one of them was available in the Argentine case.").
85. CMS award, supra note 56, para. 324.
86. Argentina made a similar argument before the Enron Annulment Committee.
See Enron Annulment, supra note 31, para. 369.
87. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 25 (noting, "The failure to give effect to the
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ICSID system in order to avoid arbitration and minimize the
impact of their obligations under BITs." In May 2007, Bolivia
advised the World Bank that it was withdrawing from the ICSID
Convention, and the President of Bolivia, Evo Morales, implored
other member-States within Latin America to likewise vacate the
ICSID Convention." Some of his counterparts may have heeded to
his call; particularly, Ecuador and Venezuela have expressed a
desire to minimize potential BIT liability by curbing the ICSID
jurisdiction.o Ecuador has taken a step even further by excluding
disputes related to non-renewable resources from ICSID
arbitration."
Some States are concerned that their intentions should be
more salient in the ICSID decisions, reflecting the bargained-for-
exchange of the BITs; that is, on the one hand an aggrandized flow
of investment and investor protections, and on the other, the abil-
ity of States to preserve their policy interests.9 2 A proper balance
needs to be found in a system that is perceived to be favoring and
expanding investor rights.93 Significantly, one of the most impor-
tant talismans for foreign investors-the State of Brazil-is not
considering becoming a party to the ICSID Convention due to the
ICSID's former whimsical decisions and apperceived bias towards
investors.94
The ICSID Tribunals' capricious decisions surface the general
clear language of the BIT and to do justice to the intent of the state parties [is]
causing states to rethink their commitment to guarantee investor rights through
BITs ... before ICSID."; see also Luke Eric Peterson, Another Argentine Crisis Award
is Annulled, ICSID Committee Strikes Down $100+Million Verdict in Favour of Enron
Corporation, Investment Arbitration Reporter News and Analysis, August 2, 2010,
para. 5, available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20100802_1 (describing
investors as likely to be "glanc[ing] nervously over their shoulders . ").
88. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 25 (noting, ". . . they have led some state to
withdraw from the ICSID system . . . a system which they perceive to lack
legitimacy.").
89. See Damon Vis-Dunbar, Luke Eric Peterson & Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Bolivia
Notifies World Bank of Withdrawal from ICSID, Pursues BIT Revisions, INv. TREATY
NEws, May 7, 2007, available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/
itn-may9_2007.pdf.
90. See Treaty Developments Related to Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, WHITE &
CASE INT'L DISPUTES QUARTERLY (Fall 2007), available at http://www.whitecase.com/
idq/fall_2007/ial/.
91. See Jos6 Rosell, The CMS Case: A Lesson for the Future?, 25 J. INT'L ARB. 493,
501 (2008).
92. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 25 (noting, "Tribunals fail to recognize or
accept the nature of that bargain underlying many BITs . . "
93. See Rosell, supra note 91, at 501 (arguing, "a more balanced interpretation of
BITs is absolutely essential."
94. Id.
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problems of an arbitration system that lacks a genuine appellate
influence and seemingly no means for resolving cases, which reach
opposite conclusions from the same facts." It is precisely the call
by States, investors, and scholars towards legitimacy 9 6 that has
likely been the instigation for a change in the framework of the
ICSID, which the Annulment Committees have evidently heard
loud and clear.
B. The CMS v. Argentina Annulment Decision
The CMS Annulment decision heavily criticized the legal rea-
soning of the CMS Tribunal," but refrained from annulling the
Tribunal's award given its restrained role as a mere Annulment
Committee. Indeed the Committee was quick to belabor its frus-
tration of having its hands tied: "if the Committee [were] acting as
a court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the award on this
ground."" Many scholars have noted the prominent irritations
that arise after reading the Committee's opinion, as though it
were acting as a whistle blower."
The CMS Annulment Committee centered its criticism on the
Tribunal's conflation approach-specifically, in regards to the
relationship between the NPM clause and the customary necessity
defense."oo Since each article was distinct, a different set of
requirements should have applied to their procedure.0 1 The Com-
mittee frankly rejected the conflation approach, noting that under
the lex specialis rule, the NPM clause would be applied as the
more specific provision even if the customary necessity defense
were taken to be the primary rule.102 Alternatively, under the pri-
mary/secondary approach, the NPM clause is undoubtedly the pri-
mary rule and thus the customary necessity defense would be
95. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at n.34.
96. See id. at 25 (explaining, "As states reconsider their commitment to ICSID . .
the viability of investor-state arbitration is called into question.").
97. CMS Annulment, supra note 31, para. 136 (highlighting superfluously, "the.
errors and lacunas in the Award" and, "[the Tribunal] appli[ed] [the NPM clause]
cryptically and defectively .
98. Id. para. 135.
99. See von Staden, supra note 28, at 10 (noting "That such a strongly worded
critique of the erroneous interpretation and application of the relevant law by the
CMS tribunal does not suffice to establish the existence of an annullable error may
justly be seen as irritating.").
100. CMS Annulment, supra note 31, para. 130.
101. See von Staden supra note 28, at 9.
102. CMS Annulment, supra note 31, para. 133.
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applied secondarily only if there were a violation of the BIT."o' In
either case, the NPM clause would have to be applied, which the
Tribunal failed to do.
The CMS Annulment decision was a watershed opinion in so
far as it displayed the problems of the ICSID system; prominently,
erroneous jurisprudence could present challenges to the authen-
ticity of BITs and to the ICSID system. The CMS Annulment Com-
mittee, seeing the conflation analysis as the persuasive approach
among the ICSID Tribunals, attempted to redirect their influence
so that subsequent Tribunals addressing similar issues did not
follow problematic precedent.1 04 At its extreme, the CMS Annul-
ment opinion is viewed as an attempt to "call into question the
legitimacy of the CMS Tribunal and, more generally, a system
that lacks appellate review to reverse gross and outcome determi-
native errors of law."1 o5 After CMS Annulment, some States have
been reluctant to enforce the Tribunal awards, a further demarca-
tion of ICSID's vulnerability.10 6 The Argentine government pub-
licly declared that it would be a political contest for Argentina to
pay the CMS Tribunal award, which the CMS Annulment Com-
mittee had found to be legally erroneous.'
The most important effect of the CMS Annulment opinion was
one that the ICSID judges likely did not intend-it sparked
affirmative arguments for the possibility that a grave error of law,
such as conflation, would result in an effective non-application of
the NPM clause and be enough for annulment.10 If the CMS
Annulment Committee were to rule again on the same facts today,
it would likely find grounds for annulment under Article 52(1)(b)
of the ICSID Convention; that is, by taking non-application to be
an effective manifest excess of the Tribunal's powers. To rule oth-
erwise is to permit egregious errors of law to be protected by a
tenuous shield of draconian procedure.
C. The Sempra v. Argentina Annulment Decision
Three years later and under frighteningly similar facts, the
Sempra Annulment Committee reached the opposite conclusion as
the CMS Annulment Committee, holding that the Sempra Tribu-
103. Id. para. 129.
104. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 29.
105. Id.
106. See Rosell, supra note 91, at 501.
107. Statement of Osvaldo Guglielmino, Procurador del Tesoro de la Nacion
Argentina, American University, Washington College of Law, October 24, 2007.
108. See Smith & Rubino, supra note 21, para. 15.
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nal had manifestly exceeded its powers since it failed to apply the
NPM clause by equating it with the customary necessity
defense.'09 However the substantive analysis was nearly the same
for both CMS Annulment and Sempra Annulment, except that the
latter further expounded the differences between the NPM clause
and the customary necessity defense.
First, the Sempra Annulment Committee found that treaty
law took general precedence over customary law aside from where
it violates the rule ofjus cogens,10o which would only happen if cus-
tomary law preempted a treaty provision because the terms of the
latter conflicted with that of the former.' The Sempra Annul-
ment Committee, however, acknowledged that the NPM clause in
the treaty was not preempted by the customary necessity defense;
thus, the parties could "invok[e] a defense of necessity in whatever
terms they may agree . . . [albeit] politically or economically
unwise, but this does not render them unlawful."1 12
Next, the Sempra Annulment Committee noted that the NPM
clause and the customary necessity defense were drafted for dif-
ferent purposes, the former circumventing instances where State
action is permitted; but, the latter demarcates instances where
the necessity defense is permitted and prohibited, which apply
only where a violation of a State action has already occurred.'
Furthermore, the NPM clause and the customary necessity
defense varied in "material respects," and as such the latter could
not be considered a "guide to interpret[] " the former.'1 4
The principal reason for the disparity between the CMS
Annulment and Sempra Annulment holdings apparently resides
in the fact that the Sempra Tribunal, unlike the CMS Tribunal,
had explicitly stated, "[T]here is no need to undertake a further
judicial review under Article XI (the NPM clause) given that this
Article does not set out conditions different from customary law in
such regard.""' The Sempra Annulment Committee took this
109. Sempra Annulment, supra note 31, paras. 164-65.
110. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969), art. 53, available at, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
111. Sempra Annulment, supra note 31, paras. 201-02; see id. para. 197 (noting that
customary law did not provide for "a preemptory 'definition of necessity and the
conditions for its operation' in the context of the interpretation of the treaty-based
exception clause of Article XI) (quoting the Enron award, para. 376)).
112. Id. paras. 201-02.
113. Id. paras. 187, 200, 203; see also von Staden, supra note 28, at 11.
114. Sempra Annulment, supra note 31, paras. 198-99.
115. Id. para. 121(parenthetical added).
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statement as evidence that the Sempra Tribunal had, "adopted
Article 25 of the ILC Articles (the customary necessity defense) as
the primary law to be applied, rather than Article XI of the BIT,
and in so doing made a fundamental error in identifying and
applying the applicable law."" 6 The failure to apply the NPM
clause, evident from the Tribunal's own statements, constituted a
manifest excess of powers that had to result in the annulment of
the award as a whole.17
Even still, it is arduous to reconcile the difference in outcomes
between Sempra Annulment and CMS Annulment. The apparent
distinction is that the Sempra Tribunal did not apply the NPM
clause whereas the CMS Tribunal directly applied the NPM
clause by conflating it with the customary necessity defense;"' yet
both Annulment Committees obviously identified the same errors
of law-each Tribunal effectively used the customary necessity
defense as the primary law-but reached opposite conclusions as
to annulment. The real difference here between application and
non-application of the NPM clause appears to be a matter of mere
semantics. If the Sempra Tribunal had applied the customary
necessity defense yet made mention of the application of the NPM
clause, even if in name only, then the holding would have been
based on whether an error of law rises to a mistake grave enough
to be considered a manifest excess of powers, which would be a
grounds for annulment under the ICSID Convention."' The dis-
parity in outcomes of these cases is problematic since the Annul-
ment Committees identified the same flawed analysis under
identical facts.
D. The Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision
In May of 2007, the Enron v. Argentina Tribunal sided with
Enron and held that Argentina was responsible to foreign compa-
nies for abrogating its Convertibility Law and erecting the Emer-
gency Law during its economic crisis of 2000-2001; the Tribunal
practically read the U.S.-Argentina BIT as providing a shield for
investor rights during Argentina's fallout."0 Before paying $106.2
million to Enron, however, Argentina requested annulment of the
Tribunal's award, arguing that the BIT's necessity defense
116. Id. para. 208 (parenthetical added).
117. Id. para. 209.
118. CMS Annulment, supra note 31, para. 136.
119. ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 52(1)(b).
120. Enron Award, supra note 56, para. 339.
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released Argentina from liability to its foreign investors.12 1 The
Enron Annulment Committee agreed with Argentina and
annulled the Tribunal's award, finding in effect that Argentina's
actions during times of peril were not to be second-guessed by the
ICSID Tribunals. 2 2
Enron Annulment, released just one month after Sempra
Annulment,2 3 is very distinct from former annulment decisions in
that it found grounds for annulment by reading the Enron Tribu-
nal's analysis of the only way provision to be a non-application of
its terms, resulting in a manifest excess of powers. 24 Specifically,
the Committee faulted the Tribunal for giving a "cursory"125 analy-
sis of the only way provision by relying solely on the opinion of "an
economist."126 Economists will likely not be called to testify in
front of a panel of ICSID judges ever again-economists' divina-
tions don't matter, especially in retrospect.127
The Enron Annulment decision was shocking to scholars since
the facts of Sempra Annulment and CMS Annulment are the same
as those in Enron Annulment. Many were expecting confirmation
of either the Sempra or CMS approach.'28 Instead, Enron Annul-
ment raises new issues for tribunals to consider when parsing the
only way provision of the customary necessity defense and gives a
crucial paradigm of the only way provision that many tribunals
have been overlooking.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ENRON v. ARGENTINA
ANNULMENT DECISION
A. Parsing the Only Way Provision of the Customary
Necessity Defense
Under Article 25(1)(a),129 the customary necessity defense is
121. Enron Annulment, supra note 31, para. 353.
122. Id. at 362-68, 373, and 377.
123. Sempra Annulment and Enron Annulment were issued on June 29, 2010 and
July 30, 2010, respectively, supra note 31.
124. Enron Annulment, supra note 31, paras. 373-77.
125. Id. para. 376.
126. Id. para. 374.
127. See Todd Tucker, Economists Don't Count in Enron Attack on Argentina,
PUBLIC CITIZEN's BLOG ON GLOBALIZATION AND TRADE, (August 4, 2010), http:lcitizen.
typepad.com/eyesontrade/2010/08/economists-dont-count-in-enron-attack-on-
argentina.html.
128. See Smith & Robino, supra note 21, para.16 (noting that Enron Annulment
..prolong[s] the uncertainty surrounding the proper interpretation of a standard
necessity defense provision.").
129. ILC's Articles, supra note 24, art. 25.
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available to Argentina only if its actions were "the only way for
the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril.""'o This provision turns on the extent to which a
Tribunal will defer to Argentina's decisions in response to the eco-
nomic crisis.3"' If an alternative choice were available to Argen-
tina, then a literal interpretation of the only way provision would
give no deference to the State and render the customary necessity
defense moot. Similar to the approach taken by the LG&E Tribu-
nal, the Enron Annulment Committee asks for something more
than "whether . .. there were other options available."13 2 In partic-
ular, the Committee discusses the complexities involved in such
an analysis: the degree of effectiveness that the response to the
crisis would have had in comparison to alternative measures;133
whether alternative measures involved a graver breach of custom-
ary law;134 and whether alternative measures should be decided by
the Tribunal in retrospect or from the prospective of the Argentine
government with the "basis of information reasonably available at
the time .. ."
By highlighting the multitude of queries that arise from a
seemingly simple provision, the Enron Annulment Committee con-
fronts the ambiguity of the customary necessity defense which
"previous tribunals (including the ICJ) have shied away from."136
The ad hoc paradigm called for by Enron Annulment is more sen-
sible than a literal approach because it doesn't preempt the neces-
sity defense if an alternative measure or less effective means
could have been used to respond to the crisis, which may have
been less harmful to the interests of investors.' This novel
130. Id.
131. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 19.
132. Enron Annulment, supra note 31, para. 377.
133. Id., para. 371.
134. Id., para. 370.
135. Id., para. 372.
136. Sahib Singh, The Enron Annulment Decision's Exposure of Necessity's
Endemic Uncertainty: A Welcome Critique, October 23, 2010, EJIL: Talk! (Blog of the
European Journal of International Law), at 5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1697522
137. But see Parish, supra note 33, at 185 (arguing "Whether there was some other
course Argentina could have chosen to minimize the effects of its economic collapse,
and whether the measures it in fact took stabilized the situation, made it worse or
avoided an even more catastrophic collapse, are the subject of continuing debates by
academic economists which are necessarily inconclusive because of the wealth of
historical and political counterfactuals any such questions necessarily embrace.").
Although Parish makes a strong argument, the reality is that Tribunals have to rule
one way or the other when analyzing the only way provision. This article suggests
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approach supersedes the LG&E Tribunal method, which merely
denied a literal interpretation of the only way provision, and is
superior to it because the novel approach considers the adequacy
of the measures adopted and their proportionality to the crisis.3
Argentina's logical argument against a literal approach is very
impressive, was acknowledged by the Enron Annulment Commit-
tee,13 9 and may have persuaded it to annulment even if in the end
it nominally left the proper interpretation to the Tribunal's
deference.140
Although Enron Annulment did not confirm a perfect analysis
of the only way provision, the finality of the literal approach to the
provision likewise supports a non-literal interpretation. To adhere
to a literal interpretation "implies, of course, that the necessity
defense will become practically unavailable in cases of economic
necessity where states almost invariably will have different
options how to react."141 In effect, a literal interpretation vitiates
the customary necessity clause from the ILC's Articles, making it
impracticable to apply in any situation.14 2 As a matter of policy,
this approach makes little sense since Tribunals should intend to
give effect to the parties' intentions, and where parties include a
NPM clause in a treaty, it will always be the case that the parties
meant something rather than nothing from its words. Further-
more the parties' intentions under the U.S.-Argentina BIT lend
support to the conclusion that Argentina should be able to act in a
crisis, "in exchange for granting investors greater protections than
would have been available in customary law, the states . . . sought
to preserve for themselves greater freedom of action . . . than
would have been available in customary international law."14 3
that in making such a decision, the broad approach to the only way provision is
proper.
138. See Reinisch, supra note 40, at 201 (faulting the LG&E Tribunal for not
having "incorporated considerations of adequacy and proportionality.").
139. See Enron Annulment, supra note 31, para. 369 (affirming, "As Argentina
points out, there will almost inevitably be more than one way for a Government to
respond to any economic crisis, and if this interpretation were correct, the principle of
necessity under customary international law could rarely if ever be invoked in
relation to measures taken by a Government to deal with an economic crisis.").
140. See Singh, supra note 132, at 4 (arguing, "a literal interpretation cannot be
evinced to uphold Article 25's exceptionality.").
141. Reinisch, supra note 40, at 200.
142. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 20.
143. Id. at 14; see also Parish, supra note 33, at 176 n.36 (noting the bargained-for-
exchange and citing to Judge Posner, "Doctrines of necessity . are justified in the
economic analysis of law by the principle that risk should be allocated to the party
able to insure against it at least cost. A party should be able to rely upon the doctrine
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The core of necessity is the existence of an immediate threat
for which a State takes an emergency measure to preclude.'4 4
Where the necessity defense applies, a State's action is said to be
voluntary in the sense that it "had a genuine choice as to whether
to undertake the emergency measure."145 If the act is voluntary,
then it can't be mandated. A literal reading of the only way provi-
sion would mandate a State's action in the sense that there really
was no other viable option for the State to take. The Enron Annul-
ment Committee brings to light these basic fundamentals of the
customary necessity defense, which require it to not be repressed.
For this reason alone, Enron Annulment is a remarkable step for-
ward for the ICSID system. Indeed, divinations as to what could
have happened if alternative courses of action were taken by a
government will likely be dismissed by future Tribunals as sus-
pect.1 46 Economists, who have been used as expert witnesses to
support investment companies,14 7 will no longer be given the time
of day in an ICSID court-and indeed, investors should be wary.
This is good news for the 157 ICSID member-States,14 8 especially
in the midst of a global recession, allowing State autonomy to
maintain its proper place in international investment. Where the
essential security of a country is at stake, leaders of countries
should be able to make decisions that are in the best interests for
their people, not for foreign investors who are hoping to canter
away from a State's crisis with a bag of money and an early retire-
ment in Cabo.
B. Left in Limbo: The NPM Clause and the
Customary Necessity Defense
Although the former section of this note praised Enron Annul-
ment for its treatment of the only way provision, it does not follow
only if his costs of insuring against the risk of a supervening event are greater
than those of the party against whom the doctrine is invoked.").
144. See Commentary to the ILC's Articles, supra note 47, para. 1.
145. Parish, supra note 33, at 170.
146. See Todd Tucker, Public Citizen's Blog on Globalization and Trade, Economists
Don't Count in Enron Attack on Argentina, (August 4, 2010), available at http://
citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/2010/08/economists-dont-count-in-enron-attack-on-
argentina.html (supra note 127).
147. See Enron Annulment, supra note 31, para. 376; see also ADC Affiliate Limited
& ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. the Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/16), Award of the Tribunal, October 2, 2006, para. 61.
148. See ICSID List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention,
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ContractingStates&ReqFrom=Main
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that Enron Annulment is wholly perfect. In fact, Enron Annul-
ment marks an unwarranted and novel split in Annulment Com-
mittee decisions by avoiding the question as to the adequate
interrelationship between the NPM clause and the customary
necessity defense."' The Enron Annulment Committee intention-
ally evaded an analysis of their relationship, deciding that they
were beyond the scope of its analysis, "[T]he substantive operation
and content of Article XI (the NPM clause) and the customary
international law principles of necessity, and the interrelationship
of the two, are issues that fall for decision by the tribunal."5 o
Whether or not done in good faith, it is unlikely that prospective
Annulment Committees will sua sponte drop the argument for
lack of an answer as evidently the Enron Annulment Committee
has done.
There is scant understanding of the interaction between the
NPM clause and the customary necessity defense. 15 1 This fact
becomes salient after viewing the Argentine Gas Sector Tribunal
Cases, which take different stances on their proper relationship.1 52
Moreover, the CMS Annulment Committee, consisting of the most
prestigious figureheads in international law,15 1 is well known for
its barrage of criticism towards the conflation approach taken by
the CMS Tribunal.'5 4 Similarly, the Sempra Annulment decision
revolved around the relationship between the two articles and
found the conflation approach to be a grave error of law."
In shirking this contentious debate, Enron Annulment disser-
vices the international arbitration community by effectively dis-
seminating as superfluous nearly all of CMS Annulment and
much of Sempra Annulment. The modern view on the matter is
that the NPM clause and the customary necessity defense should
149. See id. at 176.
150. Enron Annulment, supra note 31, para. 405 (parenthetical added).
151. See Parish, supra note 33, at 176.
152. See section II(B) above.
153. The membership of the CMS Annulment Committee was comprised of Judge
Gilbert Guillaume (former President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)),
Judge Nabil Elaraby (a former judge of the ICJ), and Professor James Crawford (ILC
Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), all of whom are considered superstars in
the international legal community. See Jitrgen T. Kurtz, ASIL Insights, ICSID
Annulment Committee Rules on the Relationship between Customary and Treaty
Exceptions on Necessity in Situations of Financial Crisis, December 20, 2007, vol. 11,
issue 30, 22-23, available at http://www.asil.org/insights071220.cfm (noting that the
"particular membership [of] the [CMS Annulment] report is likely to have persuasive
effect on . .. pending cases.")
154. CMS Annulment, supra note 31, para. 130.
155. Sempra Annulment, supra note 31, paras. 198-99, 208.
2012] 371
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:2
be considered as separate and distinct doctrines, resulting in the
application of different legal tests.' There is a contemporary
accord, at least among international legal scholars, that a genuine
difference exists between the two articles and their respective par-
adigms.17  Scholars have affirmed the primary/secondary
approach as the adequate approach because it makes the most
sense under a traditional treaty interpretation analysis.' As a
matter of customary international law, the conflation approach
violates the treaty interpretation principle of ut res magis valeam
quam pereat, which states that each clause must be given effect.'59
Moreover the primary/secondary approach fares better than the
conflation approach because the latter does away with the
requirement of interpreting the terms of the treaty and thus fla-
grantly disregards what the parties intentionally put into writing.
Since the language in the NPM clause differs from that of the cus-
tomary necessity defense and does not directly refer to it, to sup-
plant one for the other for the sake of convenience does not make
sense.
By deferring to the Tribunals to decide the proper relation-
ship between the NPM clause and the customary necessity
defense, Enron Annulment commits its only faux pas and effec-
tively defers a different debate for another day: whether an error
of law could be grave enough for annulment. By answering the
question as to the relationship between the two articles, Enron
Annulment could have clarified the ambiguity that remained after
Sempra Annulment and CMS Annulment regarding egregious
errors of law. But Enron Annulment did not leave its readers com-
pletely in the dark. Meticulous readers will note that egregious
errors of law are likely enough for annulment post-Enron
Annulment.
C. Are Errors of Law Enough for Annulment?
The ICSID review process is curbed so that awards are not
156. See Parish, supra note 33, at 176.
157. See Rosell, supra note 91, at 498-99; see also von Staden, supra note 28, at 14-
15.
158. See von Staden, supra note 28, at 9-10.
159. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 14 (noting, "[the conflation approach]
violates the Vienna Convention rule of lex specialis and the canonical rule that each
treaty provision ... be given effect."); see also Singh, supra note 33, at 3 (noting, "the
conflation methodology essentially jumps straight to that envisaged by Article 31(3)(c)
VCLT," whereas the primary/secondary approach reaches clearer decisions since
"identifying the operative primary rule enables the logical application of Article 31
through its step by step analysis.").
372
ENRON V. ARGENTINA
subject to appeal.6 0 Conspicuously, the ICSID Convention does
not permit an Annulment Committee to overturn a Tribunal's
award even for egregious errors of law."6 ' As the Sempra Annul-
ment Committee confirmed, "'Disregard of the applicable rules of
law must be distinguished from erroneous application of those
rules which, even if manifestly unwarranted, furnishes no ground
for annulment' . . . [whereas] 'failure to apply the applicable law
[constitutes] a ground for annulment ."'"162 In other words, non-
application of a requisite rule of law is sufficient for annulment-
such was the case in Enron Annulment and Sempra Annulment
where it was determined that the Tribunals failed to apply the
NPM clause-whereas erroneous application is a mere error of
law and is not enough for annulment of a Tribunal's award.
Yet this apparent black letter law is turning gray post-Enron
Annulment and post-Sempra Annulment. Although the Sempra
Annulment Committee described its basis for annulment as a non-
application of the NPM clause,"' its decision rested on a tenuous
distinction between erroneous application and non-application of
the law."' The Sempra Tribunal opinion could just as easily have
been read as an erroneous application of the NPM clause since the
Tribunal was intending to apply the NPM clause vicariously
through the customary necessity defense, which would not have
been enough for annulment under a traditional approach to
annulment review. '65
The Enron Annulment decision pushes the envelope even fur-
ther than the Sempra Annulment, begging the question where the
line should be drawn to decide whether an error of law is so grave
as to effectively deprive the applicable law of its intended meaning
and purpose, furnishing a ground for annulment. 16  The Enron
Tribunal applied both the NPM clause and the customary neces-
160. See Burke-White, supra note 5, at 1.
161. ICSID Convention, supra note 12, at 24 (as interpreted by former Annulment
Committees).
162. Sempra Annulment, supra note 31, paras. 173-74 (citing Maritime
International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea (1989) 4 ICSID Reports
79, 87, at 5.03-5.04) (citing Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia
(ICSID Case No. ARB/71/1), Decision on Annulment of May 16, 1986 (Amco I)).
163. Sempra Annulment, supra note 31, para. 196.
164. See id. para. 208 (opining that the Tribunal had used "Article 25 [to] 'trump[]'
Article XI in providing the mandatory legal norm to be applied. Thus [the
Tribunal] made a fundamental error in identifying and applying the applicable law.").
165. See Sempra award, supra note 56, paras. 376, 378-88 (notably, "The Tribunal
believes that [the NPM clause] is inseparable from the customary law standard
[i.e., the customary necessity defense].").
166. See von Staden, supra note 28, at 13.
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sity defense explicitly, but interpreted them so equivocally that
the Enron Annulment Committee found its analysis to result in
non-application of the applicable law.67 This change in the Enron
Annulment Committee's analysis from application to non-applica-
tion is so slight that it may easily be overlooked.
Alternatively, the Enron Annulment Committee could have
found that errors of law in the award did, in fact, constitute a
manifest excess of powers, which would have served as a basis to
overturn the award. Respondents for MTD Annulment have
argued this proposition:
"There comes a stage . . . at which a tribunal, in purport-
edly applying a rule of law, gets it so wrong that it must be
regarded as having disregarded the rule and not really hav-
ing applied it at all. The purported application of the rule
must be so inadequate, and suffused with such fundamen-
tal error, that it transcends the mere commission of an
error in applying the law and becomes instead a veritable
case of its non-application.""
While it appears that the former argument is precisely to
which the Enron Annulment Committee effectively concurred, it
did so in a nebulous manner by masquerading an error of law as a
non-application of the applicable law. In reaching this decision,
whether candidly or not, the Enron Annulment Committee
absconds from the scope of proper annulment review as under-
stood by the CMS Annulment Committee.'
By departing from the traditional concept of substantive
annulment review, scholars have predicted that the Enron Annul-
ment Committee will likely be criticized for blurring the line
between annulment and appeal. 70 However, it engaged in such a
review for good reason. Applicable law must be given meaning and
content beyond a mere title; that is, paying lip service to the NPM
clause and the customary necessity defense without actually
expounding either or both of them is not the same as application.
This is exactly what the authors of Enron Annulment were seek-
167. Enron Annulment, supra note 31, paras. 384, 393.
168. See Opinion of January 20, 2006 annexed to the Respondent's Annulment
Reply, para. 25, MTD Equity Sdn Bhd.& MTD Chile v. The Republic of Chile (ICSID
Case No. Arb/01/07, Decision on Annulment, 21 March 2007.
169. See Smith & Robino, supra note 21, para. 15.
170. See von Staden, supra note 28, at 13 (noting, "For some commentators, the
conclusions reached by the Enron committee[] concerning the presence of the
annullable failure to apply the proper law will still smack too much of appellate
review."
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ing to correct. Scholar Andreas von Staden lucidly explains, ". . .
[the applicable law] has to be understood not merely in purely for-
mal terms in the sense of not even referring to the applicable legal
provisions, but must be given a substantive meaning. "171
Enron Annulment will force foreign investors to make logical
arguments that don't beg the question. Moreover Enron Annul-
ment takes away investors' get-out-of-jail-free-cards since corpora-
tions are less likely to be given an esoteric exit in extraordinary
circumstances. Pragmatically, corporations should expect to sink
when an economy crashes rather than being thrown a golden life
raft only to watch ordinary citizens drown. 172
Enron Annulment's model of substantive review will result in
a step forward for Argentina's economic status. Argentina's
restricted access to international finance markets will only be
loosened when it starts paying back its foreign debt. However,
where investors are free to reach into Argentina's pockets, which
are not deep even a decade after its economic collapse, 7 1 then it's
likely that Argentina will continue to default on its foreign debt
driving inflation to monumental percentages.17 ' Furthermore
recent Tribunal awards have continued to aggrandize moneta-
rily,"17 making it less likely that Argentina will satisfy its debt
claims. Through all of this, it should not be overlooked that the
Enron Annulment is an extension of the views of the greatest
minds in international arbitration; that is, a continuum of CMS
Annulment, which shifts the scale in the favor of Argentina.
V. FINALITY: THE WRITING IS ON THE WALL
"Nothing is final until it is right." -Abraham Lincoln
The proper balance of power for the ICSID annulment judges
to consider is said to involve "emergency relief in rare cases of fun-
damental importance but to uphold the finality of awards in the
face of alleged relatively minor substantive and procedural
171. Id.
172. The exception to this proposed rule is, of course, Goldman Sachs: the Death
Star that keeps a golden parachute for economic crashes navigated by its very own
Goldman bankers. See generally Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine,
Rolling Stone (Apr. 5, 2010, 3:58 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-
great-american-bubble-machine-20100405.
173. Argentina's foreign debt in 2011 is 15 billion USD, with a domestic budget
deficit between 2 and 7 billion USD. See Court backs Argentina government's debt
plan, BBC News, March 31, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8596850.stm.
174. Inflation in 2011 could reach up to 20%. See id.
175. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 19, at,380.
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flaws."7 While balancing these two ends, the principle of finality
is generally seen to take precedence over the principle of substan-
tive correctness."1 7  Substantive correctness should not be cast
aside to ensure that the finality of awards remains static if there
be egregious errors littered throughout a Tribunal's analysis.
There is no balance between finality and correctness when proper
interpretation is obviated as if it were a superficial legal fiction.
The Enron Annulment opinion should be read for what it's
worth-an intent to restore stability to the ICSID system by forc-
ing Tribunals to go beyond mere lip service when interpreting the
provisions of the NPM clause and the customary necessity
defense.
While Enron Annulment is not binding on the ICSID as a
matter of law,17 1 precedent can be highly persuasive authority in
subsequent decisions dependent on the quality of the opinion."
Enron Annulment should be very impressive on the ICSID, having
presented a much more in-depth analysis than former Tribunals
save for its avoidance of the perennial question as to the relation-
ship between the NPM clause and the customary necessity
defense. Its pragmatic decision for annulment based on the effec-
tive non-application of applicable law will allow the ICSID to
counterbalance its system's foregone conclusion of finality with
that of correctness, at least where there is an egregious error of
law, and thereby boost its legitimacy."o Alternatively, holding
that finality always trumps correctness will continue to discour-
age States from joining the ICSID, facilitate the system's illegiti-
macy, and effectively turn the ICSID system into an arbitrary
Caesar's thumbs-up or thumbs-down.
176. Christoph H. Schreuer, ICSID Annulment Revisited, 30 LEGAL ISSUES OF
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 103, 122 (2003).
177. See Jason Clapham, Finality of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: Has the Tide
Turned and is there a Need for Reform?, 26 J. INT'L ARB. 437 (2009); see also
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, 891-94 (2001).
178. There is no formal concept of stare decisis under the ICSID Convention. See
Burke-White, supra note 5, at 1.
179. See von Staden, supra note 28, at 15 (explaining, "its persuasive authority [is]
based on the more cogent and convincing [the] argument.").
180. See id.
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